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ABSTRACT
The paper presents a study of the City of Boston's permanent
jobs hiring agreement program. Boston's program provides an
example of the job linkage approach to community economic
development: the strategy of linking downtown expansion or
revitalization to jobs for city residents. The paper
describes and evaluates Boston's permanent jobs hiring
agreement program in order to guide the development of future
job linkage programs in Boston and other cities.
Boston's permanent jobs hiring agreement program is designed
to induce private developers and employers to provide new
permanent jobs for Boston residents, minorities, women, and
low income persons in exchange for public subsidy. Although
Boston's program is too new to permit a conclusive assessment
of its success, five variables appear to be important: 1) the
type of industry that the employers are in; 2) the degree of
political pressure involved; 3) the amount of financial
leverage the City retains; 4) the City's access to and
control over the employers; and 5) the size of the project
and number of employers involved. The importance of these
variables is tested in a case study of one of Boston's more
successful permanent jobs hiring agreements: the employment
agreement negotiated with the developers of the $540 million
Copley Place mixed-use development.
As a result of the analysis, modifications to Boston's
permanent jobs hiring agreement program are recommended to
make the program more successful. In closing, however, the
paper recognizes the limitations of the job linkage approach
to community economic development and presents an example of
another strategy which cities may want to combine with the
job linkage approach.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Bernard J. Frieden
Title: Professor of City Planning
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INTRODUCTION
The strategy of promoting inner-city community economic
development by linking downtown (central business district)
expansion or revitalization to jobs for inner-city residents
is a fairly new but increasingly popular response to the
growing problems of unemployment and poverty in many of the
nation's cities. Boston is one of the first cities to
formalize such a linkage strategy by implementing programs
designed to spread the benefits of Boston's phenomena].
downtown growth to its primarily low income and minority
residents. Boston's first job linkage program was designed
to counter discrimination and provide opportunities for
Boston's residents in the temporary, construction-related
jobs created by publicly-subsidized downtown revitalization
projects. Boston has recently developed a permanent jobs
hiring agreement program that extends the job linkage
strategy to the permanent jobs created by publicly-subsidized
projects; a program with much greater potential benefits for
Boston's residents.
While preliminary research indicates that other cities
in the United States have recently implemented or are in the
process of implementing job linkage programs, most of these
programs are directed only towards temporary, construction
related jobs. Information on existing job linkage programs
is sparse, especially information on the less common
permanent jobs linkage programs. Thus, the purpose of this
paper is to describe and evaluate Boston's permanent jobs
hiring agreement program in order to guide the development of
future job linkage programs in Boston and other cities.
The first. part of the paper will provide an overview of
Boston's permanent jobs hiring agreement program: 1) the
history of the program; 2) the actors involved and their
roles; 3) the structure of the agreements; and 4) the overall
success of the program to date. Unfortunately, although
Boston's program is one of the first permanent jobs linkage
programs to be established in the nation, it is still too new
and the results too sparse to permit a conclusive assessment
of the success of the program. Instead, this paper compares
the results from individual agreements in order to identify
variables that might have affected the success of the
agreements. Five variables appear to be important: 1) the
type of industry that the employers are in; 2) the degree of
political pressure and publicity involved; 3) the amount of
financial. leverage the City retains; 4) the City's access to
and control over the employers; and 5) the size of the
project and employers involved.
In order to test these variables, the paper investigates
in detail one of the more successful permanent jobs hiring
agreements: the employment agreement negotiated with the
developers of the $540 million Copley Place mixed-use
development. Analysis of the hiring results at Copley Place
reveals that all five variables cited above were important in
determining the success of the employment agreement. In
particular, the type of industry appears to have been a
crucial factor. This finding raises the question of whether
the success of permanent jobs hiring agreements is more the
result of the occupational mix and employment needs of the
particular industries involved than a conscious effort on the
part of employers to comply with the agreements.
Drawing from the analysis of Copley Place, the paper
concludes with a general evaluation of Boston's permanent
jobs hiring agreements. This evaluation is centered on three
questions: 1) what is the goal of the agreements; 2) do the
agreements accomplish this goal; and 3) how might the
agreements be improved. Recommendations for improving the
agreements follow directly from the analysis of the factors
inf].Lencing the success of the agreements. In closing,
however, the paper also recognizes the limitations of the
permanent Jobs hiring agreements, even if improved according
to the recommendations.
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OVERVIEW OF BOSTON'S PERMANENT JOBS HIRING AGREEMENTS
HISTORY OF AGREEMENTS
The concept of requiring employers in Boston to adopt
resident-preference hiring practises in exchange for public
subsidy originated in the late 1970's when the Boston Jobs
Coalition was organized under the slogan "Boston jobs for
Boston people." The Coalition consisted of community groups
and minority construction workers organized to counter the
blatant and persistent discrimination of local construction
unions which had been generally excluding Boston residents
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(white, minority, and female). Public outcry over these
discriminatory practises was heightened by the fact that a
princi pal source of construction funds in Boston during this
period was the federal Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD). As a result of the Nixon Administration's
new federalism plan, HUD had given the City of Boston primary
responsibility for administering these federal funds in
Boston. Thus, the City of Boston (under Mayor Kevin White)
had a major role in determining the construction hiring
practices in Boston.
In 1979, the Boston Jobs Coalition was successful in
persuading Mayor White (who was under the pressure of re-
election) to sign an Executive Order requiring construction
firms working on projects funded by the City or with federal
funds administered by the City to employ at least 50% Boston
residents, 25% minorities, and 10% women out of the workforce
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for each construction trade involved in the project. Boston
became the first city in the United States to implement such
a resident hiring quota. The construction unions challenged
the constitutionality of this resident hiring quota but the
Executive Order was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in
2
February of 1983 and was subsequently incorporated into a
Boston City Ordinance in October of 1983 (Document 62: 1983,
Ordinances of 1983 Chapter 30).
The Boston Jobs Coalition had originally proposed that
the hiring quotas also be applied to the permanent jobs
created by City-funded or administered projects. However,
the political pressure for permanent jobs hiring quotas was
not as strong as for construction jobs because discrimination
in permanent jobs hiring was neither as blatant nor as
universal as in construction jobs hiring. Although not part
of the 1983 Boston City Ordinance, permanent jobs hiring
goals were included in several projects receiving leases on
public property or publicly-subsidized loans (industrial
revenue bonds) from the City's economic development
agencies--the Boston Industrial Development Finance Authority
(BIDFA) and the Boston Local Development Corporation (BLDC).
Permanent jobs hiring agreements were also required of some
developers and employers as a condition for receiving
subsidized loans from federal Urban Development Action Grants
(UDAG's) since HUD's approval of these projects was partly
determined by the number of jobs that would be created for
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low income, unemployed, and minority persons. Although HUD's
approval was not based on the number of jobs to be created
specifically for Boston residents, since the UDAG's were
applied for, received, and administered by the City, public
pressure resulted in the incorporation of resident hiring
goals in many of the City's UDAG loan agreements.
In 1984, The City of Boston's Neighborhood Development
and Employment Agency (NDEA) standardized these permanent
jobs hiring agreements into an Employment Initiative
Agreement (EIA) to be applied to all projects receiving any
form of public financial assistance in Boston. The NDEA
developed the EIA in an attempt to rationalize the agreements
and thus protect the City from complaints over the
arbitrariness of former agreements. Whereas the goals
included in prior agreements had been negotiated on an
individual project basis, the NDEA set standard goals in the
EIA to be applied to all projects.
ROLE OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT AGENCY
The City of Boston's Neighborhood Development and
Employment Agency (NDEA) was formed in 1982 when the City's
Neighborhood Development Agency merged with the City's
Economic and Employment Policy Agency. The NDEA's general
objectives are to provide employment opportunities for
Boston's residents and to promote housing and neighborhood
development. One of the NDEA's primary responsibilities is
to establish and administer job training and placement
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programs for economically disadvantaged and unemployed Boston
residents, including the Boston Jobs Exchange referral
service. In addition, since the NDEA is the agency which
receives and distributes federal funds for the City of
Boston, the NDEA is responsible for insuring that the City
adheres to federal grant requirements. In 1983 HUD required
the City to develop an Urban Develoment Action Grant
Management Plan outlining the City's procedures for
administering the grants in compliance with federal
affirmative action guidelines. As part of the City's UDAG
Mgnagement Plan, the NDEA was given primary responsibility
for monitoring project compliance with the permanent jobs
hiring agreements included in UDAG loan agreements.
Within the NDEA, the monitoring and enforcement of
permanent jobs hiring agreements is assigned to the Contract
Compliance and Enforcement Division, originally established
by the 1979 Mayor's Executive Order to monitor construction
jobs hiring quotas. Since November 1983, the Compliance and
Enforcement Division has taken over the responsibility of
monitoring and enforcing all of the City's permanent jobs
hiring agreements, including those agreements negotiated
prior to the development of the standard EIA. Although other
City agencies are still responsible for the approval of
projects receiving public subsidy, these agencies cooperate
with the NDEA in negotiating the permanent jobs hiring
agreements which the NDEA will enforce.
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DESCRIPTION OF AGREEMENTS
The permanent jobs hiring agreements negotiated by BIDFA
and BLDC prior to the development of the standard Employment
Initiative Agreement (EIA) included only a 50% Boston
resident hiring goal. Most of these BIDFA/BLDC agreements
were negotiated with industrial employers and were included
as "Memoranda of Agreement" in either loan agreements (if the
employers received State-subsidized industrial revenue bonds)
or leases (if the employers leased City-owned property). The
permanent jobs hiring agreements included in UDAG loan
agreements. negotiated prior to the EIA incorporated a 50%
Boston resident hiring goal and varying minority, female,
low/moderate income, economically disadvantaged (originally
4
defined as "CETA-eligible"), and impact area resident goals.
In contrast to the construction jobs hiring quotas
established by the 198. Boston City Ordinance, the permanent
Jobs hiring goals do not apply to each occupation but to the
project's total permanent workforce.
The standard EIA now specifies "new permanent jobs"
hiring goals of 50% Boston residents, 30% minorities, and 50%
females, with an additional goal to be negotiated for
6
economically disadvantaged persons. These categories are
not mutually exclusive: new employees can be counted in as
many categories as they qualify for. In addition, the goals
apply to all minorities, females, or economically
disadvantaged persons, whether or not they are Boston
residents. Like the permanent jobs hiring agreements
12
negotiated prior to the EIA, the hiring goals also apply to
the project's total workforce, not to each individual
employer within the project. The NDEA no longer targets
impact area residents because it now feels that the impact
area should include all of Boston. The NDEA has also
eliminated the category of low/moderate income (originally
required by HLD) because the maximum income levels set by HUD
were so high that most projects far exceeded the low/moderate
7
income hiring goals.
The goals for Boston residents, minorities, and females
established in the EIA were based on the City of Boston's
current labor market statistics and recent employment
8
trends. Since minorities and females represented 27% and
-18% of the City of Boston's labor force, respectively, the
NDEA felt that approximately 30% and 50% of the new jobs
created in Boston should be filled by minorities and females,
respectively. However, since the current employment trends
indicated that the type of industries expanding in Boston
(finance, insurance, real estate, and professional service
sectors) would be likely to hire women but less likely to
hire minorities, the NDEA expected that the 50% female hiring
goal would be relatively easy to attain while the 30%.
minority hiring goal would be more challenging. In contrast
to the minority and female hiring goals, the NDEA established
the 50. Boston resident hiring goal as more of a target
figure since only 37. of all jobs in the City were currently
filled by Boston residents and the employment trends
indicated that most new firms were not in the manufacturing
industries that traditionally employed Boston residents.
The EIA also includes a "first-source" provision
requiring employers in the project to use the Boston Jobs
Exchange for job referrals 10 days prior to any other public
advertising for all job vacancies and new employment
positions. In addition, the EIA establishes a monitoring
process in which the employers are required to submit
quarterly hiring and workforce reports indicating the number
of new employees, Boston residents, minorities, females, and
economically disadvantage persons that were hired. Although
these reports are broken down by individual employers and
occupational categories, the hiring goals
project's total workforce. In the case
development, the developer is required
efforts" to rent to tenants who will abide
efforts" include incorporating written
tenant compliance in the tenant leases.
The EIA is intended to be legall
inclusion in the loan or lease agreement
City with the developer of the project
speculative development) or the employer
employer-initiated development). Since
effect as long as the loan or lease is in
goals apply to both the initial hiri
subsequent hiring due to expansion or t
apply only to the
of a speculative
to "use its best
by the EIA; "best
encouragement of
y binding through
negotiated by the
(in the case of a
(in the case of an
the EIA remains in
effect, the hiring
ng period and to
urnover. However,
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unlike the 1983 Boston City Ordinance for construction jobs,
the permanent jobs EIA does not specify sanctions for non-
compliance (such as suspension of financial assistance or
provisions for the recovery of public funds), although the
NDEA's operational procedures state that "corrective action"
will be initiated as necessary. The extent of this
corrective action is thus limited by the language of the loan
or lease agreement and usually entails proving that the "best
ef-forts" requirement has not been met.
RESULTS TO DATE
Of the 33 projects involving permanent jobs hiring
agreements on record at the NDEA as of July 1984, only 18
projects were completed and had hired new permanent
employees. Unfortunately, all. of these 18 agreements were
negotiated prior to the development of the standard EIA.
However, since each agreement included a 50% Boston resident
hiring goal and some of the agreements served as models for
the EIA, an analysis of the hiring results from these earlier
agreements can be useful in predicting the success of the
EIA.
Twelve of the 18 earlier agreements were negotiated by
BIDFA and BLDC and included only a 50% Boston resident hiring
goal. Five of the 18 agreements were negotiated by the NDEA
with project developers or directly with employers over
federal UDAG loans and included minority, female, and low
15
income persons hiring goals as well as Boston resident goals.
In addition, there is one permanent jobs hiring agreement
negotiated by the NDEA on a project that did not involve
public financial assistance. In this case, the hiring
agreement was included in a City-issued license.
While the majority of the 18 agreements for which there
are reported permanent hiring results were agreements
negotiated by BIDFA/BLDC, 78% of the permanent jobs filled
Under these agreements are from the five projects receiving
UDAG's, with 40% of the jobs filled by the $540 million
Copley Place development alone. Thus, although the results
for the 1B agreements indicate that in aggregate the
agreements have exceeded the 50% Boston resident hiring goal,
many of the smaller projects have not yet reached the goal.
It is also important to note that since these 18 agreements
negotiated prior to the EIA did not require that hiring
reSuLlts be reported by each employer within a project, it is
difficult. to evaluate project compliance even on an
individual project basis.
Due to the variation in agreement requirements, the 18
projects with reported hiring results can only be compared by
their compliance with the 50% Boston resident hiring goal.
As of July 1984, only nine of the 18 projects reported
compliance with the 50% Boston resident hiring goal; four of
the 18 projects had reached 75-90% of the target goal and
five of the projects had attained less than 60% of the
target. There are many variables that could have contributed
16
to these different compliance rates. The NDEA considers the
following factors to be important: the degree of political
pressure and publicity associated with the project; the
degree of financial leverage the City retained over the
developer or employer; the City's access to and control over
employers; and the size of the project and employers
involved. My own interpretation of the hiring results
reve aled another, perhaps more important factor influencing
project compliance: the type of industry that the employers
are in. The following analysis will compare the 18
agreements in order to test the importance of these
variables. The importance of the variables will also be
investigated more thoroughly in the case study.
FACTORED THAT SEEM TO INFLUENCE COMPLIANCE
All of the nine projects found in compliance with the
50% Boston resident hiring goal were projects in which the
employers were in the type of industries most likely to hire
Boston residents: traditional blue-collar manufacturing and
service sector industries that employ a high percentage of
10
low-paid, low-skilled workers. Given that the resident
hiring goal applies to the total workforce (not by
occupation) and that Boston residents tend to be employed in
low-paying, low-skilled positions., it follows that the higher
the percentage of low-paying, low-skilled positions in an
industry or business, the more likely the resident hiring
17
goal wi.ll be met. The predominance of low-skilled jobs is
implied by the finding that most of the employers found in
compliance with the Boston resident hiring goal had also
hired a high percentage of persons classified as
"low/moderate income" (even if they were not required to do
so by the agreements), presumably to fill low-paying, low
skilled positions. For example, the employers at Copley
Place (two hotels and many retail businesses) collectively
reported hiring 62% Boston residents and 82% low/moderate
income persons. The five employers in the manufacturing
sector +found in compliance reported hiring 52-82% Boston
residents and 75-93% low/moderate income persons. In
contrast, most of the nine projects not found in compliance
with the Boston resident hiring goal also did not report
hiring high percentages of low/moderate income persons,
although some of these employers were in the manufacturing
sector. These results suggest that the non-complying
employers probably do not employ a high percentage of low
skilled labor (for example, manufacturing firms that produce
specialized rather than mass-produced products), and thus may
have difficulty attaining the Boston resident hiring goal
because Boston residents tend not to have adequate skills.
Another variable that seemed to affect project
compliance was the degree of political pressure and publicity
associated with the project. For example, two of the
projects found in compliance with all minority., female,
low/moderate income, and impact area resident hiring goals as
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well as the 50% Boston resident hiring goal were the UDAG
assisted Copley Place development and Cablevision, a City
licensed cable TV company. Both projects were well
publicized, expected to have City-wide impacts, and would
create a large number of permanent jobs: thus they were under
tremendous public pressure to fulfill their permanent jobs
hiring commitments. Conversely, most of the projects that
have not achieved the 50% Boston resident hiring goal
involved smaller and less-publicized industrial businesses.
Many of these projects are located outside of the downtown
Boston area and are thus outside the center of public
attention.
Project compliance also seemed to be influenced by the
degree of financial leverage that the City retained over the
developer or employer (depending on who signed the
agreement). Although neither the EIA nor the earlier
permanent jobs hiring agreements specify any sanctions for
non-compliance, the City can have some financial leverage
over a project by threatening to withhold financial subsidy.
For example, the NDEA attributes the compliance of the
developer of Copley Place in part to the fact that the UDAG
loan was administered in installments, enabling the City to
delay payments over questions of non-compliance. However, it
is unlikely that the City could recover already distributed
funds if permanent jobs hiring goals are not met, due to the
difficulty of proving that the developer or employer did not
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use its "best efforts." Thus, the City has no financial
leverage over developers or employers that receive the full
amount of their financial assistance prior to the hiring of
permanent employees, as is the case with projects receiving
State-subsidized industrial revenue bonds.
Two other variables that seemed to affect project
compliance were: whether the permanent jobs hiring agreement
was negotiated with the project developer (in the case of
speculative developments) or directly with the employer (in
the case of employer-initiated developments) and whether the
project involved many small employers or a few large
employers. Only four of the 18 agreements were negotiated
with project developers rather than directly with employers.
In these four cases, the employers are tenants and are not
legally bound to the hiring agreement because the lease
language between the developer and tenant only "encourages"
tenant compliance. The NDEA also does not have direct access
to the employer's hiring records because the tenants report
to the NDEA through the developer. Thus, compliance in these
projects should be lower than in projects where the NDEA can
hold employers directly responsible. Since compliance is
determined by the total project, not based on individual
employers, compliance should also be lower if the project
involved many small employers rather than a few large
employers: the more numerous the employers the greater the
effort required of the developer and the City to monitor and
promote compliance. The limited sample of four developer
20
negotiated agreements tends to support this reasoning. The
Copley Place development was the only one of the four
projects found in compliance, and this compliance could be
attributed to the other factors previously discussed. In
addition, as the case study will reveal, not all of the
employers at Copley Place are in full compliance. In fact,
the project's overall compliance is primarily due to the
compliance of the two hotel employers which account for over
50-% of the permanent jobs created. The size and number of
employers also appear to have been factors affecting
compliance in one of the other developer-negotiated
agreements, the Boston Marine Industrial Park. In this case,
the project did not reach full compliance even though it was
developed and managed by the City's own Economic Development
and Industrial Corporation (EDIC). This surprising result
can be explained by the fact that the project involved leases
with at least 28 different small industrial tenants, making
the EDIC's role of monitoring and promoting tenant compliance
difficult to fulfill.
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CASE STUDY OF COPLEY PLACE PERMANENT JOBS HIRING AGREEMENT
HISTORY OF PROJECT
Description of Copgev Place Development
Copley Place is a massive $540 million mixed-use
development located on 9.5 acres of land and air rights over
the Massachusetts Turnpike leased from the State's
Massachusetts TurnpikI::e Authority (MTA). The development
totals 3.4 million square feet of building space including:
35,000 square feet of retail. space; two hotel towers 36 and
38 stories high; four 7-story office buildings; and a 9-story
apartment building [Yudis: 1984]. Copley Place marks the
junction of several Boston neighborhoods, including the Back
Bay, Bay Village, South End, St. Botolph, and Fenway
neighborhoods. In addition, the development abuts Boston's
historic Copley Square.
The Copley site was cleared in 1965 by the MTA as part
of the Massachusetts Turnpike extension. It remained
undeveloped and desqjate for 15 years, creating a major
blight in the surrounding neighborhoods. The combination of
Turnpike interchanges, railroad and utility rights-of-way,
and large vacant spaces made the site hazardous to both
pedestrian and vehicular traffic, thus presenting a physical.
barrier between the adjacent neighborhoods. Unfortunately,
the existing roadways and rights-of-way also made development
of the site difficult, requiring construction over roadways
and major street and utility relocations.
The State had been approached many times by developers
with proposals to lease and develop the Copley site.
However, partly due to a weal: development climate in Boston,
these earlier proposals were not able to meet the City and
State development objectives. Market conditions strengthened
in the 1970's, however, and in 1977 a development team with
substanti.l expertise and financial backing expressed
interest in the site. The funding and development expertise
came primarily from one of the partners in the development
team, the Urban Investment and Development Company (UIDC), a
Chicago-based, wholly-owned subsidiary of Aetna Life and
Casualty. UIDC had recently completed a 3 million square
foot retail/office/hotel development in Chicago and proposed
to construct a similar development at the Copley site. In
addition to LJIDC's strong track record and financial.
resources., UIDC had obtained a firm commitment from a major
hotel chain [Hollister and Lee: 1979).
Flzannin~ Process: The "Front End" AD2roach
The State was concerned with the negative impacts that
such a large development could produce but at the same time
was anxious to have the Copley site developed and impressed
with the strength of UIDC's proposal. UIDC's proposal for
"Copley Flace" came in the wake of the infamous "Park Plaza"
development fiasco nearby in Boston. In the case of Park
Plaza, both the City and the State had followed a traditional
planning approach: 1) preparing development guidelines for
the site based on a preliminary assessment of the potential.
environmental impacts; 2) soliciting fairly detailed
development proposals; 3) choosing a proposal; and
4) submitting the chosen proposal to a public hearing and
approval process. The State was painfully aware of the
failure of this traditional planning approach at Park Plaza:
public opposition to the chosen development proposal was so
strong that project approval was delayed for six years and
the developer eventually withdrew from the project. In
retrospect, the State realized that much of the public
outrage over Park Plaza could have been avoided by
incorporating public review into earlier stages of the
planning process [Hollister and Lee: 1979).
To avoid another fiasco like Park Plaza and
minimize the risk of losing UIDC's commitment to the project,
Governor Dukakis chose a "front end" planning approach for
Copley Place. The State granted an option to UIDC for the
development of Copley Place but required UIDC to subject all
proposals to the scrutiny of a Citizens Review Committee.
Thus, the final development concept evolved through
interaction between the developer and the public: the public
was able to propose as well as react to plans.
The Citizens Review Committee (CRC) for Copley Place was
formed by representatives from at least 25 community and
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neighborhood organizations. Through a series of workshops
and informal meetings, the CRC formulated recommendations for
the development of the site to be presented to the State and
negotiated with UIDC. The CRC recommendations centered on
five major concerns: 1) maximizing economic benefits to the
surrounding communities; 2) rejoining adjacent neighborhoods;
3) coordinating scale and design with nearby projects;
4) improving pedestrian access; and 5) ameliorating
significant adverse physical, social, and economic impacts.
Establishment of Egmigyment Goals
As part of the CRC process, a Task Force on Community
Economic Development was formed to make specific
recommendations on the employment impacts of Copley Place.
The community representatives considered the job creation
impact of the development to be one of the most important
beneficial aspects of the project. The final UIDC proposal
called for the creation o-f approximately 6,280 permanent jobs
(of which 3,350 were expected to be new positions) and 650
construction jobs. At that time, Boston's overall
unemployment rate was 7. 2%. with even higher rates
experienced in the neighborhoods adjacent to Copley Place.
In addition, studies indicated that Boston residents were
capturing a decreasing portion of the jobs in the City, with
only 38% of the City's jobs filled by Boston residents in
1.977 [Boston Redevelopment Authority: 1980, p.16]. Thus, one
of the major objectives of the Task Force was to insure that
the new jobs created at Copley Place would go to the people
most in need and most affected by the project.
Based on current City of Boston labor market statistics,
the Task Force recommended that hiring goals of 50% women and
.30% minorities be established for the new permanent jobs
created at Copley Place. These same goals were later
incorporated into the NDEA's standard Employment Initiative
Agreement (EIA). Unlike the later EIA, however, the Task
Force defined "permanent jobs" to include the part-time and
seasonal. jobs created at Copley Place because many of the new
jobs were not expected to be full-time, year-round positions.
The community's concern over the loss of jobs to suburban
residents, the high unemployment rates in the neighborhoods
near Copley Place, and the issue of neighborhood displacement
also spurred the Task Force to recommend 50% Boston resident
11
and 1.7.2% "impact area resident" hiring goals. The 50%
Boston resident goal was modeled after the 1983 Boston City
Ordinance for construction jobs. The 17.2% impact area
resident goal was based on the fact that 17.2% of the City's
labor force resided in the designated impact area. In
addition to these hiring goals, the Task Force also
recommended that LJIDC provide community-oriented retail space
at reduced rents to minority and community-owned businesses.
These Task Force recommendations were accepted by UIDC and
included as provisions in the MTA lease agreement. Three
Task Force recommendations were not accepted by UIDC:
26
1) a 5% hiring goal for handicapped persons; 2) a "first
source" requirement for all employers with seven or more
employees to provide advance notice of job vacancies to an
affirmative action employment office established at Copley
Place; and 3) the application of the hiring goals to each
business within the development and across every major
occupational group within the business, rather than to the
project's total workforce.
Subsequent to the MTA lease signing, UIDC increased the
scale of its proposal and sought federal subsidy through an
Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG). Since the federal.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) requires
that projects receiving UDAG's provide benefits to low income
people, the Citizens Review Committee was able to reinforce
the hiring goals included in the MTA lease and propose
additional. goals for low income people in the UDAG agreement.
NATURE OF AGREEMENT
Description of Documents
The earliest document incorporating a permanent jobs
hiring agreement for Copley Place was the MTA lease signed by
Governor Dukakis and UIDC in 1978 and amended in 1980. The
lease has a term of 99 years. Schedule D of the lease
(entitled "Affirmative Action") includes the permanent jobs
hiring goals negotiated with UIDC during the citizen review
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process: 50% Boston residents, 30% minorities, 50% women,
17.2% impact area residents, and "good faith efforts" to hire
handicapped persons. These goals are not mutually exclusive
and, counter to the Task Force recommendations, apply only to
the total number of new permanent jobs created by the
development. Other Task Force hiring recommendations
included in Schedule D are the establishment of: 1) a
recruitment and referral office within the development (the
Copley Place Employment Office) to facilitate affirmative
action hiring during the initial leasing period; and 2) a
Liaison Committee composed of representatives from the
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, the Boston
Redevelopment Authority, the City and State manpower training
agencies, and community based recruitment and training
organizations to assist employers with meeting the hiring
goals. Schedule D also requires UIDC to notify tenants of
its commitment to the hiring goals and encourage the tenants
to comply. UIDC must encourage tenants having seven or more
employees to report their hiring results to the Liaison
Committee "at least every four months during the first five
years after the Initial Rent Increase Date and thereafter
with such frequency as the EMTAJ shall determine."
Schedule D also requires UIDC to report to the Liaison
Committee "at least once a year to review the overall
affirmative action status" of the development. In addition
to these hiring agreements, Schedule D requires UIDC to
provide 15, 000-20,000 square feet of community-oriented
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retail space with reduced rents for minority and Community
owned businesses.
As previously mentioned, UIDC changed its proposal for
Copley Place after signing the MTA lease and decided to seek
federal subsidy through a UDAG. The Cogly Place UDAG
Application submitted by the City to HUD in 1980 incorporated
the same permanent jobs hiring agreement included in the MTA
lease. However, HUD's application guidelines required the
City to also estimate the percentage of the permanent jobs
created by the project that would be filled by persons of
low/moderate income and CETA-eligible persons. Based on
employment trends at comparable hotel, retail, and office
developments in Eoston, 40% of the jobs created at Copley
Pl ace were expected to pay salaries that would qualify the
employees as persons of low/moderate income [Economics
Research Associates: 1979, p.62]. Although the same
employment projections indicated that only 1% of the total
jobs. created at Copley Place would be CETA-subsidized jobs,
the City estimated that 25% of the projected jobs could be
filled by CETA-eligible persons based on the projection that
25% of the jobs created would be unskilled or service worker
positions [Economics Research Associates: p.613. HUD then
included these percentages as additional hiring goals in the
UDAG Grant Agreement between the City and HUD.
Two other documents reinforce the permanent jobs hiring
agreements established in the MTA lease and UDAG Agreement:
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1) the 1981 Grant and Loan Agreement establishing the
procedures by which the City would transfer the UDAG funds to
UIDC; and 2) the 1983 Cpley Place EmGloyment Gals: Plan of
Implgmentation stating UIDC's commitment to the permanent
jobs hiring agreements and outlining the steps UIDC would
take to fulfill its commitment. These steps included:
sponsoring job fairs and informational seminars, producing
tenant handbooks describing the hiring agreements,
maintaining communication with community-based and
governmental recruitment and training agencies, and
allocating funds for pre-employment and skills training
programs. In addition, in 1984 the City succeeded in
obtaining a "first-source" agreement from UIDC requiring the
UIDC Management Company (the agency hired by UIDC to maintain
and operate Copley Place) to notify the Copley Place
Employment Office five days prior to public announcement of
any job vacancies.
Role of the Liaison Committee
The Copley Place Permanent Jobs Hiring Liaison Committee
was established in 1982 to assist the employers at Copley
Place with meeting the hiring goals, in accordance with the
Task Force recommendations and the MTA lease. The Committee
included representatives from the MTA, the State Employment
Training Council, the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination, the Boston Redevelopment Authority, the NDEA,
Action for Boston Community Development (a community-based
organization), and the affirmative action officer for UIDC.
While none of the documents comprising the Copley Place
permanent jobs hiring agreement gave the Committee formal
authority to enforce the hiring agreement, Schedule D of the
MTA lease empowered the Committee to "establish such
procedures as it deems necessary to its operation."
Moreover, both LJIDC and the Copley Place employers were under
the impression that the Liaison Committee had the authority
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to monitor their hiring practises. Thus, the Committee was
able to with confront the Copley Place employers directly
rather than through LJIDC and to obtain the hiring results of
these employers by occupation rather than for the entire
workforce. As will be discussed further in the section on
compliance, face-to-face contact with employers was a key
factor in obtaining compliance, and hiring reports by
occupation were critical in achieving affirmative action at
management levels.
In addition to monitoring the hiring process at Copley
Place, the Committee assisted employers in recruiting Boston
residents, minorities, women, and low income persons by
recommending hiring procedures targeted towards these
populations, participating in job fairs and mass hirings,
helping to establish the Copley Place Employment Office, and
linking employers with appropriate community-based
organizations and job training and referral agencies.
Role of the Neighborhood Develoment ad Eggg2ment Agency
As previously mentioned, the City of Boston's UDAG
Manggement Plan identified the City's Neighborhood
Development and Employment Agency (NDEA) as the agency
responsible for monitoring and enforcing the hiring
agreements included in the City's UDAG agreements. In the
case of Copley Place, the Liaison Committee largely fulfills
the NDEA's role although the NDEA is responsible for
reporting the project's overall hiring results to HUD on a
semi-annual basis.
HIRING PROCESS AND RESULTS TO DATE
Results to Date
As of October 1984,, UIDC reported that the employers at
Copley Place had hired ],143 new permanent employees: 62% of
these employees were Boston residents,. 35% minorities, 50%
women, 26% impact area residents, 83% persons of low/moderate
income, and 6% CETA-eligible persons. Thus, the employers at
Copley Place had collectively fulfilled or exceeded all of
the hiring goals except for the 25% CETA-eligible goal.
However, analysis of the reports made by the larger employers
to the Liaison Committee reveals that, on an individual
basis, none of the larger employers had fulfilled all of the
hiring goals, even excluding the CETA-eligible hiring goal.
As indicated in Table 1, the Marriott and Westin Hotels and
the UIDC Management Company have come close but not reached
TABLE 1
COPLEY PLACE HIRING RESULTS
(as of October 1984)
NEW HIRES %BOSTON
EMPLOYER TO DATE RESIDENTS XMINORITY ZFEMALE
ZIMPACT AREA
RESIDENTS
%LOW/MOD ZCETA-
INCOME ELISIBLEt
MARRIOTT HOTEL
WESTIN HOTEL
NEIMAN-MARCUS DEPT STORE
UIDC MANAGEMENT CO
72 OTHER RETAIL STORES
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT
HIRING GOAL
955
829
235
171
953
3,143
65.6%
62.6%
48.1%
53.8%
61.3%
61.5%
50%
44.0%
47.0%
23.4%
46.8%
17.5%
35.4%
301
47.0%
40.7%
63.0%
39.8%
59.1%
50.0%
50%
17.3%
27.1%
22.1%
24.6%
35.8%
26.3%
17.2%
94.7%
97.3%
82.6%
69.6%
60.1%
82.6%
40%
14.1%
0.4%
9.9%
4.3%
5.6%
25%
tPrivate employers have difficulty determining CETA-eligibility without violating privacy laws.
Thus, these reports are not accurate counts of the number of CETA-eligible persons hired.
SOURCE: Progress Reports by Copley Place employers to the Copley Place Liaison Committee,
July-October 1984.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
the 50i female hiring goal, the Neiman-Marcus department
store has almost met the 50% Boston resident hiring goal but
is far from reaching the 30/. minority hiring goal, and the 72
other retail stores are even further from collectively
meeting the minority hiring goal. On the other hand, Table 1
demonstrates that all of the employers repcrting to the
Liaison Committee have managed to meet the 17.2% impact area
resident and 40% perscos of low/moderate income hiring goals.
In addition to these hotel, retail, and building
management positions, UIDC had estimated that approximately
3,000 office jobs would be created at Copley Place. These
office jobs were expected to be filled primarily by employees
transferred from other locations rather than new employees.
Thus, neither the Liaison Committee nor the NDEA require
these office employers to report their hiring results.
Finally, it is important to note that the apparent
failure of all employers to meet the CETA-eligible hiring
goal is partly due to the difficulty that private employers
faced in determining CETA-eligibility. The federal
government's criteria for determining CETA-eligibility
included detailed information on the applicant's prior income
(including welfare payments) and family status. Private
employers do not generally ask for this type of information
because of privacy laws and are thus unable to identify CETA
eligible applicants or employees. In contrast, HUD and the
NDEA permit employers to classify persons of low/moderate
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income based on the salaries they will be paid upon
employment.-
Hiring Frgess
Due to the large number of employees hired at one time,
new hotels generally use the services of state employment
agencies to recruit and hire employees from statewide labor
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pools. Both the Westin and Marriott Hotels at Copley Place
decided to conduct such mass hirings through the
Massachusetts Division of Employment Security (DES).
However, since the DES-conducts mass hirings based on the
skills required by the employers and does not necessarily
target. Boston residents, minorities, women, or low income
persons., the Liaison Committee convinced the hotel employers
to supplement the DES hiring with other hiring practises.
Both the Marriott and Westin Hotels went beyond their normal
hiring procedures by sponsoring community job fairs,
advertising in community, minority, and women's newspapers,
and recruiting employees from community-based referral and
training agencies. The Westin Hotel also held special
meetings with women's organizations and sponsored job fairs
for women. In addition, the Marriott Hotel agreed to hire 10
Boston minorities to be trained for management level
positions, even though they normally train and promote
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employees for management positions from within.
The next largest employer, the Neiman-Marcus department
store, initiall.y began to hire employees through its
traditional method of advertising in major newspapers.
However, these initial hirings resulted in very low
percentages of minorities and Boston residents hired. Acting
on the Liaison Committee's recommendations, Neiman-Marcus
also sponsored a job fair in the minority community in
Boston. While the job fair was successful in attracting
minority and Boston resident applicants, Neiman-Marcus ended
up hiring very few of these applicants. Although the
Committee has managed to increase the Boston resident and
minority hiring at Neiman-Marcus, the store has still not
come close to achieving the minority hiring goal.
Surprisingly, the Liaison Committee has also had
difficulty obtaining compliance from the UIDC Management
Company, the building management company hired by UIDC. The
Committee was especially concerned with UIDC Management's
non-compliance because it expected UIDC's own management
company to set an example for the rest of the Copley Place
employers. Despite constant pressuring and even direct
recruitment and referral by the Committee, the UIDC
Management Company has not meet the 50'. female hiring goal.
Except for a few of the larger employers, the Liaison
Committee has not asked the 72 other retail stores at Copley
Place to report individually to the Committee. These stores
range in size from a specialty shop of two employees to a
restaurant of 124 employees, with a mean size of 13
employees. As Table I indicates, these 72 retail
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establishments collectively exceeded the Boston resident,
women., impact area resident, and persons of low/moderate
income hiring goals but were extremely low in the percentage
of minorities hired.
FACTORS INFLUENCING COMPLIANCE
Iyge of Industry
In the case of Copley Place, the type of industry
appears to have been a critical factor in determining the
employer's compliance. As was previously noted, since the
hiring goals are applied to the entire workforce and not by
occupations, the higher the percentage of low-paid, low
skilled labor employed in an industry, the more likely the
employers will comply with the goals. It is worth noting
that industry statistics for the metropolitan Boston area
indicate that 61% of the labor force employed in hotels are
in the lowest paying "unskilled" or "service worker"
positions and 48% of the labor force employed in department
stores are also in generally low-paid positions of "sales
workers" [U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission:
1983]. The employers themselves anticipated having little
problem meeting the hiring goals because the goals were
generally consistent with their established hiring
15
patterns.
Further analysis of hotel and department store hiring
patterns in Boston reveals that the major employers at Copley
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Place would probably have met most of the hiring goals even
without the permanent jobs hiring agreement. In fact, except
for a much higher percentage of minorities hired, the hiring
patterns of the employers at Copley Place do not differ
markedly from industry-wide hiring patterns in Boston. As
Table 2 demonstrates, union statistics on employees at eight
Boston hotels indicate that Boston and impact area residents
(as defined in the Copley Place hiring agreement) tend to
comprise a large percentage of the unionized workforce--
generally exceeding the 50% Boston resident and 17.2% impact
area resident hiring goals. The distribution for all eight
unionized Boston hotels is 69.4% Boston residents and 22.6%
impact area residents, compared to the 65.6% and 62.6% Boston
residents and 17.3% and 27.1% impact area residents hired by
the Copley Place Marriott and Westin Hotels, respectively
(see Table 1). Union statistics on one of the few unionized
department stores in Boston suggest that the hiring results
at the Neiman-Marcus department store may also be similar to
industry-wide hiring patterns: the unionized Boston
department store employed 44.9% Boston residents compared to
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the 48.1% Boston residents hired by Neiman-Marcus.
Although the unionized workforce does not include management
level employees, these employees (defined as officials and
managers, professionals, and technicians) comprise only 14%
and 18% of the workforce in metropolitan Boston hotels and
TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYEES IN UNIONIZED BOSTON HOTELS
(as of February 1985)
# UNION %BOSTON %IMPACT AREA
EMPLOYER EMPLOYEES* RESIDENTS** RESIDENTS**
----- --------------------------------------------------
COLONNADE HOTEL
COPLEY PLAZA HOTEL
COPLEY SQUARE HOTEL
LENOX HOTEL
PARK PLAZA HOTEL
PARKER HOUSE HOTEL
RITZ CARLTON HOTEL
303
30
111
429
374
286
74.3%
70.3%
76.7%
73.0%
70.9%
64.2%
58.4%
32.7%
23.4%
28.8%
16.6%
16.8%
17.1%
SHERATON BOSTON HOTEL 653 73.5% 27.6%
----- --------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL. 2, 388 69.4% 22. 6%
*These figures do not include managers, professionals, and
technicians.
**"Boston" and "Impact Area" residents as defined in the
Copley Place permanent jobs hiring agreement.
SOURCE: Membership mailing lists of the Hotel, Restaurant,
Institutional Employees and Bartenders Union,
Local 26 in Boston.
department stores, respectively [U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission: 1983].
Union contracts do not required unionized Boston hotels
and department stores to give preference to Boston residents.
Thus, the union statistics suggest that Boston hotels and
department stores generally hire nearby residents. I propose
two plausible explanations for this tendency: 1) the
employers (especially the hotels) prefer to hire employees
that can walk or ride msss transit to work and are thus more
flexible and reliable in adverse weather or traffic
conditions; and/or 2) the majority of the positions available
do not pay enough to attract suburban residents who tend to
have higher incomes and skill levels.
As Tables 3 and 4 illustrate, the distribution of
females in the metropolitan Boston hotel and department store
labor forces as well as the distribution of females employed
in metropolitan Boston hotels and department stores are
similar to the Copley Place hiring results: there are 5).2%
and 45.8% females in the metropolitan Boston hotel labor
force and employed by metropolitan Boston hotels,
respectively, and 70.3% and 67.0% females in Boston's
department store labor force and employed by Boston
department stores, respectively. By comparison, the Copley
Place Marriott and Westin Hotels hired 47.0% and 40.7%
females, respectively, and the Neiman-Marcus department store
hired 63.0% females (see Table 1).
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TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF MINORITIES & FEMALES
IN HOTEL & RETAIL INDUSTRY LABOR FORCES
(Boston Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, 1980)
EXPERIENCED
CIVILIAN
INDUSTRY LABOR FORCE* %MINORITY** %FEMALE
HOTELS & LODGING PLACES
TOTAL RETAIL TRADE
Department Stores
Apparel & Accessory
Stores
Eating & Drinlking
Pl aces
11 , 064
215, 090
24,526
19, 176
58,946
14.6%
5.5%
4.1%
5.6%
9.6%
50.2% "
50. 0%
70.3%
68.3%
50.5%
*"Experienced Civilian Labor Force" includes all employed
and experienced unemployed persons residing in the
Boston SMSA (including part-time & seasonal employees).
**The U.S. Bureau of the Census cautions that Census counts
tend to underestimate Blacks, Hispanics, and persons of
low income.
SOURCE: 1.980 U.S. Census of Population: Detailed Population
Characteristics (PC80-1-D)q Table 227. Data are
estimates based on a sample.
TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF MINORITIES & FEMALES
EMPLOYED IN HOTELS & DEPARTMENT STORES
(Boston Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, 1983)
INDUSTRY #EMPLOYEES* XMINORITY** %FEMALE**
HOTELS, MOTELS, AND
TOURIST COURTS
DEPARTMENT STORES
7' 103
28, 749
25. 7%
6.9%
45.8%
67. 0%
*These totals only include the employers located within the
Boston SMSA that are required to report to the EEOC:
employers with 100 or more employees.
**The EEOC does not count temporary or seasonal employees.
Since these positions tend to be disproportionately filled
by women and minorities, the EEOC figures may underestimate
the actual percentages of females and minorities employed.
SOURCE: U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
1983 EEO--1 Report Summary By Industry Within SMSA.
A similar comparison of Tables 3 and 4 to Table 1
reveals, however, that the Copley Place employers have
succeeded in hiring a much higher percentage of minorities
than would be expected given the distribution of minorities
in the metropolitan Boston hotel and retail labor forces and
the distribution of minorities employed by metropolitan
Boston hotels and department stores. The Copley Place
Marriott and Westin Hotels have both exceeded the 30%
minority hiri ng goal although minorities comprise only 14.6%
of the metropolitan Boston hotel labor force and metropolitan
Boston hotels overall employ only 25.7% minorities. While
neither the Neiman-Marcus department store nor the 72 other
retail stores at Copley Place have succeeded in meeting the
30% minority hiring goal, the 23.4% and 17.5% minorities that
have been hired, respectively, far exceed the industry-wide
patterns of less than 10% minorities in the metropolitan
Boston retail labor force or employed by metropolitan Boston
department stores.
Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate that compliance with minority
and female hiring goals is also related to the occupational
distribution within an industry: the higher the percentage
of low-paid, low-skilled jobs, the more likely the
compliance. Not surprisingly, the distributions of
minorities and females employed by metropolitan Boston hotels
and department stores overall as well as by the major Copley
Place employers are generally much higher within the lower
paying unskilled/service or sales worker positions than in
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TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION OF MINORITIES & FEMALES
EMPLOYED IN BOSTON HOTELS BY SELECTED OCCUPATIONS
(1983-1984)
OCCUFATION* %MINORITY %FEMALE
--- -------------------------------------------------------
HOTEL EMPLOYERS REPORTING TO EEOC
Managers/F'rofessionals/Technicians 10).2% 33.8%
Unskilled/Service Workers 33.2% 44.3%
COPLEY FLACE MARFIOTT HOTEL
Managers/Professionals/Technicians 23.8% 36.5%
Unskilled/Service Workers 55.9% 47.4%
COPLEY PLACE WESTIN HOTEL
Managers/Frofessionals/Technicians 16.3% 33.8%
Unskilled/Service Workers 51.6% 38.3%
---- -------------------------------------------------------
*Occupational categories as defined by and reported to the
Equal Employment and Opportunity Commission.
SOURCES: U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
1983 EEO-1 Report Summary by Industry Within SMSA.
------------------------------------------------------
Progress Reports by Copley Place employers to
Copley Place Liaison Committee, July-October 1984.
TABLE 6
DISTRIBUTION OF MINORITIES & FEMALES
EMPLOYED IN BOSTON DEPARTMENT STORES BY SELECTED OCCUPATIONS
(1983-1984)
OCCUPATION* XMINORITY XFEMALE
DEPARTMENT STORE EMPLOYERS REPORTING TO EEOC
Managers/Frofessionals/Technicians 3.6% 47..%
Sales Workers 7.0% 78.0%
COPLEY PLACE NEIMAN-MARCUS DEPARTMENT STORE
Managers/Professionals/Technicians 0.0% 65.6%
Sales Workers 20. 0% 71.4%
*Occupational categories as defined by and reported to the
Equal Employment and Opportunity Commission.
SOURCES: U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
1983 EEO-1 Report Summary by Industry Within SMSA.
Progress Reports by Copley Place employers to
Copley Place Liaison Committee, July-October 1984.
the managerial/professional/technicican positions. Thus,
compliance with minority and female hiring goals in these
industries is largely due to the dominance of lower level
occupations. However., while the distributions of females
hired by the hotels and department store at Copley Place
resemble the distributions of females hired by all
metropolitan Boston employers in these industries (across all
occupations), Tables 5 and 6 indicate once again that the
ma.jor Copley Place employers have hired a much higher
percentage of minorities than the metropolitan Boston
employers overall, for both management and lower level
positions.. The Neiman-Marcus department store presents two
notable exceptions to these findings. While Neiman-Marcus
has succeeded in hiring a much higher percentage of women for
management level positions than the metropolitan Boston
department stores employ overall, the store has failed to
match even the meager percentage of minorities employed in
management level positions in the metropolitan Boston
department stores. In fact, Neiman-Marcus has not hired a
single minority for a management level position to date.
Finally, it is important to note that in the case of the
persons of low/moderate income hiring goal, the type of
industry and occupational distribution determined the goal
itself as well as compliance with the goal. As previously
described, the 40% persons of low/moderate income hiring goal
was set by HUD based on the City's estimate that 40% of the
jobs created at Copley Place would pay salaries that would
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qualify the employees as persons of low/moderate income. The
City's projections were based on salary distributions from
comparable hotel, retail, and office employers in Boston.
Although all of the major Copley Place employers have hired
more than the predicted 40% persons of low/moderate income,
this result is more a reflection of the inaccuracy of the
City's projections than of the employers' attempts to recruit
persons of low/moderate income. Since the NDEA (with HUD's
concurrence) allows the employers to classify employees as
persons of low/moderate income based on the salaries they
will be paid at Copley Place, the fact that employers have
exceeded the 40% goal simply implies that more than 40% of
the positions available pay salaries that are below the
defined low/moderate income level. In fact, by permitting
the employers to classify persons of low/moderate income in
this manner, the City (and HUD) may actually encourage
employers to pay low salaries in order to comply with the
hiring goals. This is probably not the case at Copley Place,
however, because the qualifying salary level according to
HUD's definition of low/moderate income is much higher than
17
the median salaries paid in hotel and retail industries.
Political Pressure
The size and location of Copley Place alone were enough
to focus public attention on the development. In addition,
as previously discussed, Copley Place presented an
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opportunity for the Mayor and the Governor to redeem
themselves after the Park Plaza fiasco. Finally, the
project's receipt of an $18.5 million UDAG, the largest
public subsidy in Boston's history, forced the developer, the
City, and the State to demonstrate that concrete public
benefits would be produced in exchange for the subsidy.
The Copley Place permanent jobs hiring agreement was the
first comprehensive employment agreement to be negotiated
with a private developer in Boston. Unfortunately, the
language of the agreement does not require compliance with
the hiring goals, only that the developer use its "best
efforts" to comply. As a result, the City and the State had
limited legal control and resorted primarily to political
pressure. Mayor White, Governor Dukakis, and both of their
staffs were in direct contact with UIDC. In addition, Mayor
White held special meetings with the managers of the Marriott
and Westin Hotels [Hawes: May 1, 1980]. Luckily, both UIDC
and the empl oyers at Copley Place were vulnerable to such
pressure. UIDC wanted to establish a good relationship with
the City to facilitate future UIDC projects in Boston, and
the hotel and retail employers realized that their businesses
18
also depended on a good public image.
The Mayor, Governor, and their staffs were also
motivated by the tremendous amount of public attention
19
focused on the employment impact of Copley Place. In
addition to public participation in formulating the permanent
jobs hiring agreement, public "watchdog" organizations made
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sure that all parties involved fulfilled their roles. For
example, in 1983. the Massachusetts Association of Community
Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) filed an administrative
complaint with HUD claiming that the City was not
implementing the permanent jobs hiring agreements in
20
accordance with the provisions in the UDAG. ACORN's
complaint was accompanied by protest marches by community
residents outside of the NDEA offices and also at Copley
Place. Although HUD eventually resolved the complaint in the
City's favor, ACORN felt that the publicity caused the City,
UIDC, and the employers at Copley Place to give more serious
21
attention to the hiring agreement.
Financial Lev erarjE
Similar to the later Employment Initiative Agreement
(EIA), the Copley Place permanent jobs hiring agreement does
not specify any sanctions or corrective action that can be
taken against UIDC if the hiring goals are not met. However,
since the UDAG payments to UIDC were administered in
installments (with payments still forthcoming), the City was
able to withhold payments in order to force UIDC to meet the
terms of the loan agreement. The City could not legally
withhold payments if UIDC failed to meet the hiring goals
because the hiring agreement only called for UIDC to make a
"best efforts" attempt. In practise, however, the City
withheld UDAG payments often over the history of the loan for
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various reasons: although not the publicly-stated reason,
dissatisfaction with UIDC's hiring practises caused the City
to delay payment on at least one occasion. Prior to the
project's completion, community groups questioned UIDC's
fulfillment of the construction jobs hiring goals and were
skeptical over UIDC's commitment to the permanent jobs hiring
agreeement. According to the NDEA, Mayor White wanted UIDC
to demonstrate a strong commitment to the permanent jobs
hiring agreement and, not coincidentally, the City found
reasons to withhold UIDC's next UDAG payment. Both the City
and UIDC understood that the Mayor's concern over the
permanent jobs hiring agreement was one of the major reasons
for withholding the payment. As a result, UIDC prepared the
Copley Elace Emplogrnent Goals: Plan of Implernentation
committing LJIDC to specific, verifiable actions that would be
taken to meet the agreement, and the withheld payments were
released.
Control Over Emlgyers
The Copley Place permanent jobs hiring agreement only
gave the City legal authority over UIDC. The City had no
formal access to or control over the employers themselves.
The City was also unable to extend its financial leverage
over the employers because the employers did not receive any
benefit from the UDAG payments. The Copley Place Liaison
Committee was able to circumvent these restrictions to a
limited degree, however, due to the MTA lease provision which
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permitted the Committee to establish procedures as it deemed
necessary to its operation and the employers' impression that
the Committee had more formal authority. By asking the
Copley Place employers to report their hiring results
individually, the Liaison Committee was able to determine
which employers were not complying with which goals and act
accordingly. The Committee was also able to persuade the
employers to report their hiring results according to job
categories. Access to this information was essential for the
Committee to monitor and achieve limited success in promoting
compliance in management level positions.
Although the Committee had no legal authority to enforce
employers' compliance, the Committee operated on the "power
of intimidation." In this regard, the Committee felt that
their ability to require the Copley Place personnel managers
and upper level policy-makers to report in person was
crucial. This face--to-face contact reinforced the managers'
personal. commitment to the hiring goals: with little legal.
or financial control over employers, the Committee felt that
23
compliance hinged upon such personal commitment.
Overall however, the City and the Liaison Committee had
only limited control over the employers. While the Committee
succeeded in improving minority recruitment at the Neiman-
Marcus department store, it could not force the store to hire
qualified minority applicants. Likewise, the Committee was
unable to force the UIDC Management Company to increase its
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female hiring, even though the Committee itself referred
qualified female applicants.
Size of Pr o1ct and EmIgyers
The Copley Place example tends to support the hypothesis
that the size of the project and the number of employers
affect the enforcement of and thus compliance with the hiring
goals. Copley Place ultimately included close to 100
individual employers (excluding the office tenants). Thus,
the Liaison Committee did not have enough time to meet with
all of the Copley Place employers on an individual basis (the
Committee met approximately once a month during the initial
hiring period). Since the hiring agreement applied only to
the project's total workforce, both the City and the Liaison
Committee were primarily concerned with the two hotels and
the department store which collectively accounted for over
6C o f the total workforce. These employers also received
the most public attention. Comparison of the hiring results
for the major retail employer, Neiman-Marcus, to the
collective hiring results of the 72 smaller retail employers
suggests that the greater attention paid to large employers
produced more significant changes in hiring results.
Although both Neiman-Marcus and the 72 smaller retail
employers (reporting collectively) surpassed the industry
wide pattern for minority hiring, Neiman-Marcus hired a
larger percentage of minorities than the 72 smaller retail
24
stores collectively hired (see Table 1).
FUTURE COMPLIANCE
With over 90% of the new permanent jobs filled at Copley
Place, the Liaison Committee will no longer meet on a regular
basis. However, any Committee member can call a meeting on
25
an ad hoc basis if they feel it is necessary. UIDC will
continue to report the project's aggregate employment
statistics to the NDEA according to the terms of the MTA
lease and UDAG agreements. Although the NDEA has attempted
to obtain these reports by individual employers and
occupations, UIDC has often refused to comply because it is
not required to do so by the agreements. As has been
demonstrated, aggregate reports can be misleading. If the
NDEA cannot obtain reports by individual employers, many of
the gains made by the Liaison Committee may be lost. This is
especially a concern because of the high employee turnover in
the hotel and retail industries. However, even if the NDEA
succeeds in obtaining reports by individual employers, the
NDEA does not have the Liaison Committee's informal authority
to confront these employers face-to-face.
CONCLUSION
An evaluation of Boston's permanent jobs hiring
agreement program must first start by defining the general
objective of the program. It is important to recognize that
the objective of the program is not simply to attain the
targeted hiring percentages; these hiring goals are merely
mechanisms for achieving the program's broader objective of
changing the hiring patterns of Boston employers in a manner
that will benefit Boston residents, minorities, females, and
low income persons. In this respect, any positive change in
the employers' hiring patterns that can be attributed to the
hiring agreements should be regarded as evidence of the
success of the program, whether or not the target percentages
are met.
Given this general objective, Boston's permanent jobs
hiring agreements appear to have produced only mixed results
to date. The example of Copley Place demonstrates that even
if employers take special steps to improve their hiring
practises, their hiring results may not differ markedly from
industry-wide hiring patterns. At Copley Place, this may be
due to the fact that the hiring goals set in the Copley Place
permanent jobs hiring agreement were not high enough to serve
as goals for the hiring of Boston residents, females, and low
income persons in the hotel and retail industries. On the
other hand, the minority hiring goal may have been too high.
While minority hiring appears to be the only area in which
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Copley Place employers exceeded industry-wide hiring
patterns., it is also the only area in which employers were
far from meeting the hiring goal set in the permanent jobs
hiring agreement.
The importance of the type of industry in determining
employer hiring patterns suggests that the hiring goals in
the permanent jobs hiring agreements should be tailored to
the type of industry involved. Industries that tend to
employ higher percentages of low-paid, low-skilled labor (and
hence higher percentages of Boston residents, minorities,
females, and low income persons) should have higher goals
than those that employ lower percentages. In addition, the
hiring goals should be tailored to the occupations within
each industry to insure that Boston residents, minorities,
females, and low income persons are employed in all
occupation levels. In this case, the hiring agreements
should be combined with skill and management training
programs to meet the hiring goals at more skilled occupation
levels.
The Copley Place example also demonstrates the
importance of working directly with individual employers
rather than through project developers to improve employer
hiring practises. The Copley Place Liaison Committee played
a critical role in promoting compliance with the permanent
jobs hiring agreement because of the Committee's ability to
establish personal relationships with employers and to
monitor individual employer performance. Although the
Committee will no longer meet on a regular basis, continued
monitoring of this type seems crucial to maintain the
improvements in employer hiring practises that were achieved.
Finally, the Copley Place example indicates a need to
strengthen the permanent jobs hiring agreements to give the
City more legal and financial control over employers. The
current language requiring only that the developer use its
"best efforts" and "encourage" tenant compliance should be
strengthened to require compliance. The agreements should
also specify sanctions to be taken if employers do not comply
and, in the case of developer-negotiated agreements, be
structured to give the City direct access to and control over
employers, For example, the City could link compliance with
the permanent jobs hiring agreements to the interest rate
charged for publicly-subsidized loans or to property taxes:
if employers did not comply, the interest rate or property
taxes would be increased. In the case of developer
negotiated agreements, the City could obtain access to and
control over employers by requiring the developer to hold
tenants responsible for compliance in exchange for receiving
a share in the public subsidy (in the form of reduced rents,
for example).
Although there are many ways to strengthen the permanent
jobs hiring agreements, it is important to remember that
these agreements rely on the cooperation of private
developers and employers. The more burdensome the
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agreements, the less likely that developers and employers
will accept them in exchange for a limited amount of public
subsidy. Indeed, current and impending federal budget cuts
indicate that future public subsidies will be even smaller.
Thus, the long-term viability of this approach to community
economic development can be questioned.
Cities considering the job linkage approach to community
economic development may want to consider combining job
linkage programs with other approaches that offer potentially
longer-term benefits. One approach worth exploring is to
link public subsidies to entrepreneurial opportunities for
community residents. Once again, Copley Place offers a good
example. In accordance with the recommendations of the
Citizens Review Committee, Schedule D of the MTA lease
agreement required LJIDC to "attempt" to set aside 15,000 to
2 0,C square feet of retail space for "community-oriented"
stores serving to link the Copley Place development with the
adjacent neighborhoods. Approximately 50% of this space was
to be provided at below market rents to community and
minority-owned businesses. In addition, UIDC was expected to
provide "equal. opportunity" for community and minority-owned
businesses to obtain contracts for providing the support
services required by the project. As of March 1985, UIDC had
developed 17,500 square feet of community-oriented retail
space of which at least 70% will be rented at below market
rents to at least IC) community and minority-owned businesses.
Al though
than 5%
communi ty
employment
occupation
provide
17,50C) square feet of retail space represents less
of the total retail space at Copley Place, these
and minority-owned businesses offer training and
opportunities for community residents at all
levels (including entrepreneurial) as well as
financial resources to fund future community
development.
In conclusion, this analysis of Boston's permanent jobs
hiring agreement program indicates that the job linkage
approach may be an effective means of promoting community
economic development, especially if the hiring agreements are
tailored to the type of industry and occupations. The
effectiveness of the approach depends on the city's ability
to enforce the agreements, either through formal legal and
financial authority or through informal political pressure.
However, the approach is ultimately limited by the amount of
public subsidy that the city can offer to induce employers to
cooperate.
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FOOTNOTES
1. This movement originated in the late 1960's when black
construction workers formed the United Community Construction
Workers to gain access to construction jobs in Boston. The
black/minority construction workers movement did not make
significant gains, however, until 1976 when it was discovered
that local construction unions were also excluding Boston's
white residents. Thus, the black/minority construction
workers changed their strategy and formed the Boston Jobs
Coalition in 1977 with over 40 community groups--white and
minority. [Clark: 1985].
2. The Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers and
the Boston construction unions argued that the resident
hiring quota violated the commerce clause of the Constitution
which gives Congress the power to regulate commerce and thus
the movement of labor "among the several states." However,
the U.S. Supreme fCourt ruled that the commerce clause does
not apply if the city is "participating" in the labor market
aF an employer or contributor of funds to the project.
[Peirce: 198:.J.
3. This presentation of the evolution of permanent jobs
hiring agreements in Boston is based on interviews with Joan
Ducharme, Neil Gordon, and Henry Hardy of the City's
Neighborhood Development and Employment Agency (NDEA).
4. "CETA-eligible" refers to the now defunct federal
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act which funded jobs
for economically disadvantaged persons. As the case study
will ill.strate, determining CETA eligibility was difficult
for private employers. The NDEA now targets the same
population under the category of "economically disadvantaged"
and refers qualified applicants to the employers so that the
employers are not responsible for making this determination.
5. The EIA defines "new permanent jobs" as full-time jobs
expected to last at least two years beyond the project's
completion that were created by the project, not just
transferred from another location within Boston. However.,the
NDEA's use of the term "new permanent jobs" is confusing.
While the EIA definition excludes jobs transferred from
another location in Boston, the NDEA often includes "retained
jobs" (jobs in existence prior to the project which depend on
the project for continued existence) in the total jobs
created by a project when determining project compliance.
This is because employers do not always report compliance by
"new" versus "retained" jobs.
59
6. "Boston resident" is defined as a person who resides
within one of Boston's neighborhoods (as specified);
"minority" is defined as an individual having origins in any
black racial group of Africa, a person of Mexican, Puerto
Rican, Cuban, Central or South American origin, or an
American Indian, Alaska Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, or
Cape Verdean; and "economically disadvantaged" is defined as
a person whose income prior to employment did not exceed
specified levels or whose household receives welfare payments
or who receives food stamps or who is a foster child on whose
behalf state or local government payments are made.
7. HUD classified persons of low/moderate income as persons
whose income prior to employment did not exceed 60% of the
Boston SMSA median income for persons with the same household
size. If prior income and/or household size was unknown,
employers were permitted to use current income and assume a
household size of four. Thus, in 1984, a person could
qualify as having low/moderate income with a salary that did
not e x ceed $24,650.
8. Boston's labor market statistics and recent employment
trends were compiled in September 1983 by the NDEA using the
1980 U.S. Census and a 1982 HUD study of employment in recent
Boston developments entitled "The Employment Impacts of
Economic Development" [cited in memorandum from Neil Gordon
to James Younger, both of the NDEA, September 19, 1983].
9. This reasoning is not entirely logical: since the
minority and female hiring goals can be met by hiring
minorities and females who are not City of Boston residents,
the goals should not be based solely on the distribution of
minorities and females in the City labor force.
10. The previously cited 1982 HUD study revealed that Boston
residents tend to be hired for lower paying, lower skilled
positions in the traditional blue-collar manufacturing and
service sectors whereas they are less likely to be employed
in the growing white-collar financial, insurance, real
estate, and professional service sectors.
11. The Task.: Force defined the "impact area" as the area
surrounding Copley Place which would feel the most impact
from development of the project. This area included the
neighborhoods of the South End, St. Botolph, Back Bay,
Fenway, Lower Roxbury, Bay Village, Chinatown, and South
Cove.
12. Interview with Joan Rooney, member of the Copley Place
Liaison Committee, NDEA, February 26, 1985.
13. Telephone conversation with John Pope, Massachusetts
Division of Employment Security, March 11, 1985.
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14. Since the Marriott Hotel operates its management
training program on a nation-wide level, these 10 Boston
minorities will not necessarily be placed in management
positions in the Boston Marriott Hotels.
15. Interview with Joan Rooney, NDEA, February 26, 1985.
16. A comparison of the percentage of impact area residents
hired is not appropriate in this case since the unionized
department store (the Jordan Marsh department store) is
located outside the Copley Place impact area boundaries. The
percentage of Boston residents employed at Jordan Marsh was
derived from the membership mailing list of the United Food
and Commercial Workers Union, Local 1445 in Boston.
17. For example, in 1984 a person earning up to $24,650
qual i f i ed as a person of low/moderate income (assuming a
family size of foLtr) whereas the minimum wage rates demanded
by Boston's unionized hotel employees did not exceed $20,000.
According to the 1980 U.S. Census, median salaries paid to
full--time, year-round employees in the hotel and retail
industries were less than $15,000 in 1979.
18.. Interview with Lyda Peters, UIDC, March 21, 1985.
19. Interviews with Joan Ducharme and Joan Rooney of the
NDEA, Lyda Peters of UIDC, Mitch Fischman of the Boston
Redevelopment Authority, and James McCreight (representing
ACORN).
20. ACORN claimed that the City violated the UDAG agreement
because it had neglected to require UIDC to target persons of
low/moderate income and CETA-eligible persons. In addition,
ACORN claimed that the City had violated the federal HUD
Secti on 3 regulations by not setting hiring goals by
occupation levels. The City corrected its omission of
low/moderate income and CETA-eligible hiring goals. However,
HUD ruled that the Section 3 requirement for hiring goals by
occupation applied only to the construction-related (not
permanent) jobs created at Copley Place.
21. Interviews with James McCreight (representing ACORN) and
Joan Ducharme of the NDEA.
22. This example of the City's use of financial leverage to
strengthen UIDC's commitment to the hiring agreements is
based on interviews with Joan Ducharme and Joan Rooney of the
NDEA, Lyda Peters of UIDC, and Mitch Fischman of the Boston
Redevelopment Authority.
23. Interviews with Joan Rooney of the NDEA and Agnes McCann
of the MTA (both Liaison Committee members).
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.24. Note that Table 1 suggests a contradictory finding for
the hiring of Boston and impact area residents. However, as
was previously argued, the hiring of Boston and impact area
residents at Copley Place generally conforms with industry
wide hiring patterns. Thus, differences in the hiring of
Boston and impact area residents are not necessarily due to
differences in the enforcement of the permanent jobs hiring
agreements.
25. Interview with Joan Rooney, NDEA, April 19, 1985.
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